Trade credit use and bank loan access: an agency theory perspective by Ma, Liangbo & Ma, Shiguang
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Business - Papers Faculty of Business
2019
Trade credit use and bank loan access: an agency
theory perspective
Liangbo Ma
University of Wollongong, liangbo@uow.edu.au
Shiguang Ma
University of Wollongong, shiguang@uow.edu.au
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Publication Details
Ma, L. & Ma, S. (2019). Trade credit use and bank loan access: an agency theory perspective. Accounting and Finance, Online First
1-31.
Trade credit use and bank loan access: an agency theory perspective
Abstract
In this study we find that firms' use of trade credit significantly facilitates their access to bank loans in the
future, suggesting a complementary relationship. Such a relationship is more profound for firms with higher
perceived agency costs, i.e., firms with opaque corporate information, firms located in regions with less
developed external institutions, and firms at an early stage of existence. Firms switch from trade credit to bank
loans as the main source of debt financing as they age. However, the process is slower for firms with a greater




Ma, L. & Ma, S. (2019). Trade credit use and bank loan access: an agency theory perspective. Accounting and
Finance, Online First 1-31.




Trade Credit Use and Bank Loan Access: 
An Agency Theory Perspective 
  
Liangbo Ma , Shiguang Ma 
School of Accounting, Economics, and Finance, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, 
NSW, AustraliA 
Abstract: 
In this study we find that firms’ use of trade credit significantly facilitates their access to 
bank loans in the future, suggesting a complementary relationship. Such a relationship is more 
profound for firms with higher perceived agency costs, i.e., firms with opaque corporate 
information, firm located in regions with less developed external institutions, and firm at their 
early stage of existence. Firms switch from trade credit to bank loans as the main source of 
debt financing as they age. However, the process is slower for firms with a greater level of 
corporate information opacity and firms located in regions with weak external institutions. 
  
Keywords: Bank loans; Trade credit; Agency concerns; Information opacity; Institutions 








We would like to thank Tom Smith and Marvin Wee (the Editors) for their advice and support. We are grateful for 
the anonymous reviewers’ comments and suggestions. For helpful comments, we thank seminar participants at 
the University of Adelaide (October 2018). All remaining errors are our own.  





Why do firms use trade credit despite it being a relatively expensive form of short-term 
financing? According to Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Ng et al. (1999), a sizeable fraction of 
firms pay an implicit annual interest rate of over 40% when they fail to take advantage of early 
payment discounts. Yet, trade credit accounts for a significant proportion of total assets in both 
developed and developing markets (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Ge and Qiu, 2007; Wu et 
al., 2014). 
To explain the prevalent yet puzzling use of trade credit, existing literature provides several 
theories. The first strand of theories argues that suppliers (i.e., providers of trade credit) can 
obtain information about clients’ creditworthiness through transactions, and thus, they have a 
monitoring advantage over banks (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Jain, 2001); or that they have a 
stake in the survival of their clients which makes them willing to provide support to their clients 
through trade credit (Cunat, 2007). The second strand of theories focuses on real operations of 
firms and argues that suppliers use trade credit to price discriminate (Mian and Smith, 1992; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994), signal or guarantee product quality (Lee and Stowe, 
1993; Giannetti et al., 2011), and reduce transaction costs (Nilsen, 2002). However, both of 
these strands of theories are not without shortcomings. For example, the monitoring advantage 
theories “do not explain why suppliers regularly lend inputs, but only very rarely lend cash” 
(Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004, p. 570). While many theories in the second strand may hold in 
specific circumstances, they “do not capture what seems to be central for explaining the wide 
spread use of trade credit” (Maksimovic and Frank, 2005). Therefore, there must be more 
reasons (than what existing theories have proposed) to explain the use of trade credit. 
In this paper, we make some significant contributions to fill the void of existing literatures. 
Building on the work of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) 
and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) we propose that trade credit and bank credit can be either 
complementary or substitutive and such a relationship depends on the perceived agency costs 
of the firm. The economic theory behind our argument is that when a borrowing firm’s 
perceived agency costs are high, banks are reluctant to grant loans to the firm with the concern 
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that the firm may divert the cash for private benefits of the controlling shareholders or waste 
the cah on inefficient investments. In that case, the firm is forced to turn to the more expensive 
trade credit as the main source of debt financing. A firm’s use of trade credit indicates the 
trustworthiness of the borrowing firm by its suppliers (Guiso et al., 2004) and the quality of 
the firm’s investments (Aktas et al., 2012), which will in turn alleviate banks’ concern about 
the firm’s borrowing potential. Thus, the use of trade credit will increase the willingness of 
banks to extend loans to the firm. To this extent, trade credit and bank credit are complementary. 
Such a relationship is expected to be more profound for firms with higher perceived agency 
costs. As the borrowing firm becomes better known to the banks it is expected that the firm 
will gradually turn to banks as the main source of debt financing because bank credit is 
generally cheaper than trade credit. This argument suggests that the use of bank credit relative 
to trade credit is higher for older or more established firms. It also suggests that the 
complementary relationship between bank credit and trade credit is expected to become weaker 
as firms get older. 
We test our hypotheses on privately (i.e., non-state) controlled but publicly listed firms in 
China. China provides an ideal setting to study trade credit from an agency perspective for the 
following reasons. Firstly, the public bond market in China (and more broadly many other 
emerging markets) is still rudimentary and banks remain the dominant providers of corporate 
debt. However, at the same time, almost all banks are tightly controlled and bank credit is 
highly regulated by the governments. For political and social purposes most bank credit is 
allocated to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), resulting in restricted or no access to bank 
credit for many privately controlled firms even though the private sector has been an important 
driver of the economic growth in China. For example, data from the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBSC) show that in 2004 only 7% of all bank loans were allocated to non-
state firms and this figure dropped to less than 5% in 2009. Such a systemic bias gives rise to 
the wide-spread use of trade credit among private firms (Ge and Qiu, 2007; Cull et al., 2009; 
Wu et al., 2014). Therefore, a better understanding of the determinants of trade credit use 
remains an important issue not only for firms but also for policy makers. Secondly, in 
China, there is a wide disparity across regions in terms of economic development and 
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institutional efficiency. This cross-region disparity in terms of institutional development allows 
us to examine whether the relationship between trade credit and bank credit is also influenced 
by institutional factors such as marketization, legal protection of property rights, and law 
enforcement at the province level, as these above-firm-level intuitions are believed to affect 
the outside investors’ (including debtholders) perception of firm level agency problems (La 
Porta et al., 2000). Moreover, business laws, culture and social norms are largely the same 
across China. Thus, our single-country design enables us to disentangle the influence of 
institutional efficiency from that of other country-level factors. 
Using a sample of 13243 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2016, we find that: (1) a 
firm’s use of trade credit improves its future access to bank credit; (2) the positive causal 
relationship between trade credit and bank credit is stronger for firms with higher perceived 
agency costs measured either by the information opacity of the firm or the level of institutional 
development of the province where the firm is headquartered; (3) the moderating role of 
perceived agency costs on the relationship between trade credit and bank credit is more 
profound for younger firms than for older or more established firms; (4) and finally, firms 
gradually turn to bank credit as the source of debt financing as they get older. However, such 
a move is slower for firms with higher perceived agency costs. 
This paper builds on the theoretical framework developed by Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), 
in which the authors attribute a monitoring advantage to suppliers but argue that the suppliers’ 
monitoring advantage applies exclusively to input transactions. At the center of their theory is 
the argument that, compared to cash, most inputs are less easily diverted for the private benefits 
of the managers of the receiving firms. This agency perspective of trade credit successfully 
explains why suppliers have an information advantage over banks that specialize in evaluating 
borrower’s creditworthiness and why suppliers lend inputs but not cash. However, this theory 
does not explain what causes the substantial differences in the use of trade credit among credit 
constrained firms. For example, our data shows that the use of trade credit varies significantly 
among private firms in China, ranging from zero to 37.2% (measured by accounts payable to 
total assets) and from zero to 68.2% (measured by accounts payable to total debt), respectively. 
At the same time, a significant proportion of these firms are likely to be credit constrained due 
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to the systemic bias against privately controlled firms in the allocation of bank loans in China 
(Cull and Xu, 2000; Ge and Qiu, 2007;  Cull et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2014). This paper 
complements their theory by providing evidence that a firm’s perceived agency costs play an 
important role. 
The contributions of this study to the existing literature are significant in the following 
ways. Firstly, the majority of existing literature investigates only the impact of a firm’s access 
to bank credit for financing its trade credit. However, little is known whether and how a firm’s 
use of trade credit affects its access to bank credit.  Research on such a relationship is warranted 
because bank credit remains one of the most important sources of debt financing in both 
developed and developing countries, notwithstanding, the use of trade credit is widespread and 
forms an important source of debt financing. Thus, identifying the relationship between trade 
credit and bank credit will enable firms to compete better for scarce bank credit if they can 
secure trade credit from their suppliers. Secondly, although a large number of prior studies 
have examined the firms’ access to bank credit from an agency or information asymmetry 
perspective (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Nilsen, 2002; Bailey et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2012), 
this study shows an alternative channel through which banks allocate credit to firms in an 
environment where direct monitoring is highly costly and enforcement of formal financial 
contracts is weak. Thirdly, this study confirms the argument proposed by Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) that institutional development plays an important role in 
determining the relative use of trade credit and bank credit among firms. Furthermore, we 
provide evidence that external institutions also influence the speed at which firms move from 
the use of trade credit to the cheaper but scarce bank credit. Finally, this study makes a 
complementary contribution to the literature that examines the relationship between the firm’s 
age and bank loan access (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Sakai et al., 2010) in that we 
demonstrate that as the firm age banks are less likely to relyon the firms’ trade credit use to 
assess the potential moral hazard when making loan decisions. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research design. 
Section 3 presents and discusses the main empirical findings. Section 4 reports the results of 
robustness checks and some additional tests. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Sample, data, and statistics 
2.1 Sample selection and data sources 
This study is conducted on all privately controlled (i.e., the ultimate largest shareholder is 
neither a state-owned enterprise nor a government agency) non-financial A-share issuing firms 
listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2004 
and 2016. After we delete observations with missing data or with zero assets or sales, our final 
sample consists of 2043 firms and 13243 firm-year observations. The accounting and financial 
data of all the firms in this study are obtained from the China Securities Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. Data used to construct firm-level information opacity variables are also from CSMAR. 
Province-level institutional development data are from Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2011) for 2004-
2008 while data from 2009- 2014 are from Wang et al. (2016). The institutions’ data are only 
updated to 2014; as a result, the tests involving institutions data use a sample of 1615 firms and 
9686 firm-year observations. 
2.2 Measures of key variables 
2.2.1 Dependent variable 
Our ultimate interest is whether the firm’s use of trade credit helps to improve its access to 
bank credit. We use newly granted bank loans in the current year (scaled by total assets) as our 
main dependent variable. We also examine the firm’s relative use of trade credit and bank loans, 
whether and how it is affected by certain firm characteristics and external institutions. We use 
three variables to measure the relative use of trade credit and bank loans: the proportion of 
bank loans in total debt, the proportion of trade credit in total debt, and the ratio of trade credit 
to the sum of trade credit and bank loans.  
2.2.2 Key independent variables 
Trade credit 
We follow the convention in the trade credit literature and measure trade credit as the ratio of 
accounts payable to total assets. In addition, based on Ge and Yu (2007), we use the ratio of 
accounts payable to total sales as an alternative measure. Reflecting the concern about a strong 
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seasonal trend in the use of trade credit, we obtain the values of trade credit from both the half-
yearly and the annual reports and then collect the average of these two values. 
Perceived agency costs 
We use two sets of variables to measure a firm’s perceived agency costs by debtholders. The 
first set of variables measure the firm-level information opacity and are based on the notion that 
compared to transparent firms, firms with opaque information are more difficult and costly to 
monitor and therefore the incentive and the likelihood of large shareholders extracting private 
benefits of control are greater at opaque firms. Following Lin et al. (2011, 2013) and Hollie et 
al. (2017), these two factors measure the firm’s information opacity: 1) whether the firm is 
included in a national major stock index, 2) the number of financial analysts following the firm. 
The intuitions of these measures are well-known. In addition, prior literature has also showed 
a negative association between the quality of a firm’s external auditor and the opacity of the 
firm’s financial information (Gul et al., 2006; Dutillieux et al., 2013). Following this literature, 
we use a dummy variable to denote high information opacity if the firm’s annual report is not 
audited by a big auditor. 
Our second set of variables focus on institutional development. It is commonly held in the 
literature that large shareholders’ expropriation risk is higher in a weak institutional 
environment (La Porta et al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Bae and Goyal, 2009). Ma et 
al. (2017) demonstrate that the strength of institutions can be used as a good proxy for 
perceived agency costs in the Chinese market. In this paper, we use three institution measures. 
They are: 1) the overall marketization, 2) the strength of legal protection of property rights, 
and 3) the number of lawyers per 10,000 people. 
2.2.3 Control variables 
Following prior studies, we include the following control variables in our regression models: 
firm age, firm size, the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, the ratio of total debt to total assets, 
return on assets, annual growth of sales, the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets, and the 
proportion of independent or outside directors. In addition, we control for foreign ownership 
and government ownership because foreign ownership may help firms to acquire financing 
through their foreign partners or international financial markets and government minority 
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ownership may help to access formal bank loans. Finally, we include the total amount of 
savings in financial institutions in each province as a proxy for potential bank loan supply. 
Detailed descriptions of all the variables used in this study are provided in Table 1. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables. On average, accounts 
payable make up 8.8% of a firm’s total assets (APTA). This figure is slightly lower than that 
reported in Wu et al. (2014), whose sample period covers from 2003-2008 and significantly 
lower than that reported in Ge and Qiu (2007) whose sample period covers from 1994-1999. 
These differences are reasonable. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) demonstrate that 
the use of trade credit is negatively associated with the efficiency of formal institutions in a 
country where a firm is located. Thus, as formal institutions continue to develop in China it is 
expected that the use of trade credit would gradually decline. The mean ratio of accounts 
payable to total sales (APTS) is 18.2%, which is also lower than that reported in Ge 
and Qiu (2007), further confirming the trend in APTA. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
It can be seen from Table 2 that the mean ratio of bank loans to total assets (BLTA) is 17.4%, 
nearly double that of APTA. In terms of the relative use of trade credit and bank loans, we see 
that bank loans (BLTD) constitute 32.8% of total debt while trade credit (APTD) makes up 21.4% 
of all debt. When combined, bank loans and trade credit account for almost 55% of all debt. 
These figures clearly show it is warranted to examine the relationship between these two 
important sources of external debt financing for Chinese private firms. 
  
3. Empirical results 
3.1 The effect of trade credit use on bank loan access 
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In this section, we investigate whether the firms’ use of trade credit facilitates its access to 
bank loans. We estimate the following baseline empirical model using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression: 
 
   (1) 
The dependent variable in Equation (1) is the newly granted bank loans scaled by total 
assets in year t. All independent variables in the multivariate regression models (except for the 
institutions’ variables in corresponding models) are lagged by one period to control for 
endogeneity. We include Year, Industry, and Year*Industry in all multivariate regressions to 
control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity at the firm level. 
Table 3 presents the regression results of estimating Equation (1). In column 1, the 
coefficient of APTAt-1 is positive and significant at the 1% level. The result shows that the use 
of trade credit facilitates the firms’ access to new bank loans, indicating a complementary 
relationship between the use of trade credit and bank loans. In column 2, we replace APTAt-
1 with APTSt-1 and the result is qualitatively similar, albeit at a higher significance level. 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
In summary, the results in Table 3 confirm our expectation that the firms’ use of trade credit 
can alleviate banks’ concern about the firm’s potential agency costs because the use of trade 
credit can be seen as a positive signal of the firm’s trustworthiness as well as the quality of its 
investment. This in turn, facilitates the firm’s access to new bank loans. Thus, trade credit has 
a complementary effect on bank loan access. 
3.2 Factors influencing the link between trade credit and bank loans 
In this section, we examine the factors that may influence the link between trade credit use 
and bank loan access. In particular, we investigate the roles played by firm-level information 
opacity and province-level external institutions, in the view that the effect of trade credit in 
alleviating agency concerns and thus the positive impact of trade credit use on bank loan access 
should be particularly strong when there is higher risk of potential expropriation and moral 
hazard behaviour by the controlling shareholders of the borrowing firm.  We focus on the 
following two sets of factors that are widely regarded in the literature as good proxies for 
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potential agency costs: firm-level information opacity (Lin et al., 2011; Benson et al., 2014; 
Qi et al., 2017), and external legal institutions (La Porta et al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 
2004; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Ma et al., 2017). 
3.2.1 Firm-level information opacity 
It is expected that information opacity of a firm would strengthen its access to trade credit and 
bank loans. To test this conjecture, we add the information opacity measures and their 
interactions with trade credit to our baseline model. Following Lin et al.(2011, 2013), we use 
three measures as our proxies for information opacity: 1) whether the firm’s external auditor is 
a small auditor[1], 2) the number of analysts following the firm, and 3) Whether the firm is 
included in a national major stock index. In Equation (2) we extend our baseline model in 
Equation (1) by adding an interaction term between the trade credit and information opacity 
measure. The results of Equation (2) tests are reported in Table 4. 
 
 
                                       (2) 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
As can be seen from Table 4, the positive impact of trade credit use (APTA) on the firm’s 
bank loan access (New bank loans) is significantly stronger for firms with small 
external auditor as indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the 
interaction term. On the other hand, the impact of trade credit use is weaker for firms followed 
by more financial analysts and firms included in the national major stock index, as indicated 
by the significantly negative coefficients of the interaction terms between trade credit and the 
corresponding information opacity measures. For brevity purpose, we only 
report the regression results using APTAt-1 as the key independent variable. The results are 
qualitatively similar when we replace APTAt-1 with APTSt-1 and are available upon request. In 
summary, the results in Table 4 are consistent with our expectation that the positive relationship 
between trade credit use and bank loan access is stronger for firms with more opaque 
information. 
3.2.2 External institutional development 
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Previous studies exhibit that institutional development is an important factor that mitigates 
agency conflicts and curbs private benefits of control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et 
al., 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Qi et al., 2010). In this section, our tests are based on the 
significant variation in economic and legal development among China’s diverse regions to test 
whether institutional development influences the relationshipbetween a firm’s trade credit use 
and bank loan access. When external institutions are weaker it is easier or less costly for large 
shareholders to engage in expropriating activities. Thus, for firms located in regions with less 
developed institutions the perceived agency costs are expected to be higher and as a result, 
banks are less willing to lend to these firms. This suggests that the role played by using trade 
credit in indicating a firm’s trustworthiness should be more important, and consequently the 
positive relationship between trade credit use and bank loan access should be more significant. 
To test this conjecture, we extend our baseline model in Equation (1) by adding an 
interaction term between trade credit and institutional development measure: 
 
 
                              (3) 
The province-level institutional development data are obtained from Fan et al. (2011) 
covering the period of 2004-2008 and from Wang et al. (2016) covering the period of 2009-
2014. These authors have evaluated a wide range of economic and institutional factors in China 
and constructed a range of indices to measure these factors at the province level. In this study 
we focus on three indices as proxies for institutional development: these are 1) marketization 
as an indicator of the overall market development, 2) property rights as an indicator of the level 
of regulation and protection of property rights including contracts, and 3) the number of 
lawyers per 10,000 populations as an indicator of the easiness and efficiency of enforcement 
in the province in which a firm is headquartered. A potential issue arising from the data is that 
the indices for 2009-2014 are not directly comparable with those for 2004-2008 due to changes 
in how these factors are measured (Wang et al., 2016). To overcome this issue, we do not 
directly use these indices; instead, we use the rankings of these three measures for all 31 
provinces in mainland China. A ranking of 1 indicates the most advanced institutional 
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development and the lowest perceived agency costs. A ranking of 31 for each 
measure indicates the least developed institutions and therefore high perceived agency costs 
for firms located in that province. The results of estimating Equation (3) are reported in Table 
5. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
As can be seen from Table 5, in all three columns the coefficients of the interaction terms 
between trade credit and institutional development ranking are positive and statistically 
significant. These results show that the positive effect of trade credit use on bank loan access 
is more profound for firms located in regions with relatively less developed legal and 
market institutions. These results are consistent with our expectation as well as implications 
by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001). 
3.3 The effect of the firms’ age 
In this section, we examine the effect of the firms’ age on the relationship between trade 
credit and bank loan access as well as its effect on the moderating role of corporate opacity and 
institutional development on such a relationship. 
The firms’ age is an important factor in explaining the availability and cost of external 
financing and its effect has been extensively studied in prior literature. Diamond (1989) argues 
that a bank cannot directly observe a borrowing firm’s true quality but can observe the firm’s 
repayment behaviour. Thus, because young firms lack a track record of repayment history their 
access to bank loans is rather limited. This constraint will be alleviated as the firm establishes 
a reputation of successful repayment and no default as the firm ages.  Similarly, Boot 
and Thakor (1994) and Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue that information asymmetry between 
a bank and a firm is most severe at the early stage of the firm’s life. As the firm ages, they will 
engage in more information exchanges and establish a mutual trust relationship between them. 
This in turn alleviates the problem of information asymmetry and relieves the bank loan 
constraint. Sakai et al. (2010) and Ylhainen (2017) provide empirical evidence to further 
support the positive relationship between the firms’ age and availability of bank loans. In 
summary, the aforementioned studies suggest that banks’ concern for the potential agency costs 
with the borrowing firm would be alleviated as the firm ages.[2] 
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Diamond (1991) predicts that firms rely on bank monitoring in their early stage to 
accumulate reputation. Overtime, the acquired reputation can help to deal with moral hazard 
and the firms will switch to other sources of financing as they age. This would indicate 
that bank loans are the main source of debt for young firms. However, this argument is based 
on the implicit assumption that bank monitoring is effective and efficient or in other words is 
supported by an efficient legal and in particular enforcement system. As Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) demonstrate, in an environment with an inefficient legal 
system such as China and many other emerging markets, firms’ access to bank loans would be 
significantly constrained, particularly in their early lives when moral hazard is relatively high. 
To sum up, the aforementioned analysis indicates that younger firms are likely to have a 
higher probability of severe potential moral hazard problems compared to older firms. As a 
result, younger firms would have even more limited access to bank loans than older firms. 
Consequently, the function of trade credit in alleviating agency problem concerns and in 
facilitating firms’ access to bank loans would be more profound for younger firms. 
We test the effect of the firms’ age in two ways. Firstly, we divide our sample into young 
firms and old firms based on the median sample age. We define firms’ age as the number of 
years since the firm was founded.[3] For each subsample, we re-estimate Equations (1) to (3) to 
compare the effects of trade credit use on bank loan access between young firms and older 
firms.  Secondly, for the whole sample, we conduct the regressions with firms’ relative use of 
trade credit and bank loans as the dependent variables and the firms’ age as the key independent 
variable. The purpose of this estimate is to see if the firm’s relative use of these two sources of 
debt changes with the age of the firms as predicted by prior research. 
3.3.1 Different effects of trade credit use between young and old firms 
In Panel A of Table 6 we report the results of estimating Equation (1) for young firms and 
old firms, respectively. 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
As can be seen, for young firms (columns 1 and 2) the coefficients of APTAt-1 and APTSt-
1 are both positive and significant at the 1% level, confirming the results in Table 3 that a firm’s 
use of trade credit in year t-1 significantly facilitates its access to new bank loans in year t. 
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However, for older firms (columns 3 and 4) the coefficients of APTAt-1 and APTSt-1 are only 
marginally significant at the 10% level. The results in Panel A indicate that the complementary 
effect of trade credit use on bank loan access is more profound for younger firms than for older 
firms. Our results are consistent with prior research (e.g., Diamond, 1989; Petersen and Rajan, 
1995) that banks’ concerns about potential moral hazard risk at the borrowing firms are greater 
for younger firms than for older firms. 
Again we separately re-estimate Equation (2) for young and old firms respectively. The 
results are reported in Panel B of Table 6.[4] 
In the young firm subsample (columns 1 to 3), the coefficient of the stand-alone APTAt-
1 remains positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that when  the firms are young the 
use of trade credit can significantly improve their access to new bank loans, even when the 
firms are informationally transparent. The statistically significant coefficients of the interaction 
term between APTAt-1 and the information opacity measure suggest that for young firms the 
complementary effect of trade credit use on bank loan access is particularly strong when the 
corporate’s information is opaque and the perceived agency problems are likely to be more 
severe. 
Furthermore, we examine the results for older firms (columns 4 to 6). The coefficient of 
the stand-alone APTAt-1 is only marginally significant in specification 4, indicating that the use 
of trade credit does not significantly affect firms’ access to new bank loans when firms are well 
established. In other words, banks’ lending to older firms does not readily rely on the firms’ 
use of trade credit to assess their riskiness and/or creditworthiness. In addition, none of the 
coefficient of the interaction terms is statistically significant. The results suggest that for old 
firms, the use of trade credit does not influence firms’ access to bank loans even when 
information is opaque and potential moral hazard is high. 
Moreover, we compare the interactive effect of trade credit and institutional development 
between young and old firms. To do so we separately re-estimate Equation (3) for young and 
old firms respectively. The results are reported in Panel C of Table 6. 
The results show that for young firms (columns 1 to 3), the coefficients of the stand-
alone APTAt-1 are all significant at the 1% level, indicating that for young firms, the use of trade 
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credit significantly improves the firms’ access to new bank loans even in regions with high 
level of institutional development. The coefficients of the interaction term between APTAt-1 and 
institutions ranking are positive and significant at either the 1% or 5% level, indicating that the 
complementary effect of trade credit is stronger for firms located in regions with relatively 
weak institutions. For older firms on the other hand (columns 4 to 6), except for the interaction 
between APTAt-1 and Property rights which is marginally significant at the 10% level, neither 
of the coefficient of the other two interaction term is statistically significant, indicating that 
institutional development no longer plays a moderating role in the relationship between the use 
of trade credit and bank loan access among older firms. 
Collectively the results in Table 6 confirm our expectation that the role of trade credit use 
in facilitating firms’ access to bank loans is stronger for young firms than for older firms. The 
complementary effect of trade credit is especially strong for young firms with relatively opaque 
information and for young firms located in regions with a relatively weak institution, where 
the potential moral hazard of large shareholders engaging in expropriating activities is 
considered the highest. 
3.3.2 Firms’ relative use of trade credit and bank credit over time 
In section 3.3.1 we find that the complementary effect of trade credit use on bank loan 
access is stronger for young firms than for older firms. In this section, we will examine the 
effect of the firms’ age from a different approach. We’ll run regressions for the whole sample 
with the relative use of trade credit and bank loans as dependent variables and the firms’ age 
as a key independent variable. We apply three firm-level proxies for the relative use of trade 
credit and bank loans. Our first proxy is the ratio of bank loans to total debt (BLTD). Based on 
our analysis at the beginning of section 3.3, the firm’s age should have a positive effect 
on BLTD, that is, as firms age, they gradually switch from trade credit to bank loans as the 
main source of debt financing. Our second proxy is the ratio of trade credit to total debt (APTD). 
We expect that firm age will have a negative effect on APTD. Our third proxy is the ratio of 
trade credit to the sum of trade credit and bank loans (AP/(AP+BL)). Based on our analysis, we 
expect that this ratio should decrease with the firms’ age. We report the regression results in 
Panel A of Table 7. 
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<Insert Table 7 about here> 
The dependent variable in column 1 is BLTD. As can be seen, the coefficient of the firms’ 
age in column 1 is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The result is consistent 
with our expectation that as the firms age, they rely more on bank loans as the main source of 
debt financing than at the earlier stages of their existence. This finding is also consistent with 
prior research (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Sakai et al., 2010; Ylhainen, 2017). The dependent 
variables in columns 2 and 3 are APTD and AP/ (AP+BL), respectively. The coefficient of the 
firms’ age is negative and significant in both columns. The results indicate that as the firms’ 
age, they rely less on trade credit to finance their debt. In summary, the results in Panel A 
demonstrate that firms rely more on trade credit in their early phase when there is information 
asymmetry between the banks and the borrowing firms coupled with the banks’ concern about 
potentially high moral hazard. However, as information asymmetry is<="" span="" 
style="font-family: "Times New Roman";"> 
Again we examine the role of information opacity and external institutional development 
on the evolution of the firms’ relative use of trade credit and bank loans over time. In this paper, 
we exhibit that, all things being equal, firms with opaque information and firms located in 
regions with weak institutions are perceived to have higher risk of moral hazard. As a result, it 
would take longer for these firms to alleviate their information asymmetry with the banks, as 
well as to build their reputation to convince banks to extend loans to them. Hence, the process 
of switching from trade credit to bank loans would be slower, compared to those firms with 
more transparent information and firms located in regions with more developed institutions. 
To test this conjecture, we added the interaction terms between the firms’ age and 
information opacity measures to the models used in Panel A. The results are reported in Panel 
B of Table 7. 
The dependent variable in models 1 to 3 is BLTD. The coefficient of the stand-alone firms’ 
age is positive and significant in all models, and consistent with the result in column 1 of 
Panel A of Table 7. Our main interest here is the coefficients of the interaction terms between 
the firms’ age and information opacity measures. The coefficients of the interaction term are 
statistically significant in all three models, confirming our expectation that the switch from 
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trade credit to bank loans is slower when corporate information is opaque, but is accelerated 
when information is transparent. The results in models 4 to 9 further confirm the results in 
models 1 to 3. 
Furthermore, we add to the models used in Panel A with an interaction term between firm 
age and the institutional development measure and report the results in Panel C of Table 7. 
The dependent variable is BLTD in columns 1 to 3. The positive and significant coefficients 
of the stand-alone firm age and the negative and significant coefficients of the interaction term 
between the firms’ age and institutions rankings in columns 1 to 3 indicate that weak external 
institutions significantly slow the process of firms switching from trade credit to bank loans. 
The results are also consistent with our expectation.  In columns 4 to 6 and columns 7 to 9, the 
dependent variables are APTD and AP/(P+BL), respectively. Again, the results suggest that 
firms are less likely to rely on trade credit to finance their debt as they age because they switch 
to bank loans which are cheaper. However, this process is slower for firms located in regions 
with weak institutions. 
In summary, the results in section 3.3 provide convincing evidence that as the firms get 
older they build up a reputation with a track record of loan repayment history, and the 
information asymmetry between firms and their banks is alleviated. Thus, they gradually 
switch from trade credit to bank loans as the main source of debt financing. However, this 
process is significantly slower for firms with opaque information and for firms located in 
regions with weak institutions, where firms are perceived to have a higher risk of moral hazard. 
  
4. Robustness checks and additional tests 
4.1 Supply of trade credit 
Throughout this paper, we have focused on the impact of using trade credit to (i.e., 
accounts payable) access new bank loan. However, the supply of trade credit (accounts 
receivable) may also provide information on the firms’ financing and therefore will affect their 
future bank loan access. For example, Cull et al. (2009) find that, compared to unprofitable 
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private firms, profitable firms are more likely to extend trade credit to their customers that are 
shut out of formal credit. Such a supply of trade credit will help to improve the financial 
performance of their customers, which will in turn enhance the performance of the extending 
firms and consequently their access to future bank loans. 
In this section, we examine the impact of firms’ trade credit supply, controlling for the use 
of trade credit, on their access to new bank loans and the moderating roles of information 
opacity and external institutions on such a relationship. The results are not reported for brevity 
purpose but are available on request. 
The results show that trade credit supply has a positive impact on bank loan access, which 
is consistent with the finding in Cull et al. (2009). However, unlike trade credit use, the positive 
impact of trade credit supply on new bank loans is more profound for firms with more 
transparent information and firms located in regions with more developed 
external institutions.  One possible explanation is that for firms with low perceived agency 
costs, trade credit is less likely to be extended to related parties. 
In addition, we use net trade credit as the key independent variable. We calculate the net 
trade credit by subtracting accounts receivable from accounts payable, with both scaled by total 
assets. Thus, net trade credit takes into account both the use and supply of trade credit. 
Unreported results show a positive impact of net trade credit on bank loan access and such an 
impact is also stronger for firms with higher perceived agency costs. 
4.2 Alternative information opacity measure 
So far in this paper, we have used three information opacity measures to explore the 
moderating role of firms’ information opacity in the relationship between trade credit use and 
access to new bank loans. These three measures are a dummy variable indicating whether a 
firm’s annual report is audited by a small auditor, the number of analysts following the firm, 
and a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is included in the CSI300 index. There is, 
however, a concern that these proxies are not exogenous but related to the firms’ characteristics. 
The fixed effects used in our multivariate models can help to deal with unobserved time-
invariant firm characteristics. Formal pairwise correlation tests also show that these three 
proxies are not significantly correlated to most firm characteristics included in our models.[5] 
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To further alleviate the endogeneity concern, we use an alternative proxy for information 
opacity. Following Ma et al. (2017), we construct an opacity index that consists of three 
components, namely, trading volume, the proportion of zero-return trading days, and stock 
return volatilities. The intuitions drawn from these information opacity proxies are well known. 
To construct the corporate opacity index, we first calculate these three individual components 
of opacity. We next rank each of these three components into deciles, with a value of 9 
representing the most opaque firms and a value of zero representing the most transparent firms. 
We then sum up these three rankings and divide the sum by a factor of 27, which is the 
maximum possible value. This process yields an opacity index (Opacity) that ranges from 0 to 
0.9, with higher values indicating greater information opacity. We do not believe such a 
market-based index will be significantly correlated to firms’ opacity and formal correlation 
tests (unreported but available on request) confirm this. 
Again, we replace our original three information opacity proxies with this opacity index 
and examine the impact of information opacity on the relationship between trade credit use and 
bank loan access. The results are reported in Table 8. 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
The results in Table 8 confirm those reported in Table 4 and Panel B of Table 6. That is, 
the positive impact of trade credit use on bank loan access is significantly stronger for firms 
with more opaque information. However, such impact is insignificant for old firms. 
4.3 The impact of the global financial crisis and economic stimulus plan 
The global financial crisis (GFC) hit the Chinese economy hard during the fourth quarter 
of 2008, during that time the supply of, and consequently, the use of trade credit drastically 
reduced, and at the same time, firms’ access to bank loans were further restricted. In response 
to the financial crisis, the Chinese central government officially announced an economic 
stimulus plan on 5th November 2008. Under the stimulus plan, the central government would 
spend a total of 4 trillion RMB from the fourth quarter of 2008 till the end of 2010. Of the total 
4 trillion, the central government directly funded 1.6 trillion, with the rest funded by local 
governments and a loosened monetary policy to encourage banks to make loans to enterprises. 
20 
 
Thus, the ultimate impact on a firm’s financing is a combination of the initial GFC and the 
following economic stimulus plan. 
To capture such an impact, we create three dummy variables. Year08 is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 for all observations in year 2008 and zero for all other observations. Dummy 
variables Year09 and Year10 are similarly defined. The dummy variables and their interaction 
with trade credit use are added to our baseline model (Equation 1). The results are reported in 
Table 9. 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
The coefficients of the stand-alone APTAt-1 are positive and significant at the 1% level in all 
three models.  The insignificant coefficients of the stand-alone dummy Year08 and the 
interaction term APTAt-1*Year08 may be because the GFC had no negative impact on Chinese 
firms until the second half of 2008, and banks didn’t tighten their lending practice. The 
insignificant coefficients of the stand-alone dummy Year10 may be because the negative 
impact of GFC had eased toward the end of 2010.  Interestingly, the coefficient of the stand-
alone dummy Year09 is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, indicating that 
firms with low trade credit use had more difficulty obtaining new bank loans despite the 
economic stimulus plan. The coefficient of the interaction term APTAt-1*Year09 is positive and 
significant, indicating that trade credit use plays an even more important role in helping firms 
to get new bank loans. Our results are consistent with those of Liu, Pan, and Tian (2016), who 
find that the majority of new bank loans from the stimulus plan were extended to state owned 




Existing literature does not provide sufficient evidence on how the firms’ use of trade credit 
could impact on their access to bank loans. This question is, however, important given that 
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bank loans remain a very important source of debt financing and the use of trade credit is 
widespread in many emerging markets. 
Building on the work of prior studies, we apply an agency approach to investigate the effect 
of firms’ use of trade credit on their access to bank loans. We argue that a firm’s use of trade 
credit sends a signal to outside investors (banks in this case) about the trustworthiness of the 
firm and the quality of its investments. This would help to ease the banks’ concern about 
potential agency costs at the firm, and as a result, banks would be more willing to lend to the 
firms. Using a sample of privately controlled but publicly listed Chinese firms we find that the 
use of trade credit can significantly facilitate firms’ future access to bank loans. This finding is 
consistent with our expectation and indicates a complementary relationship between trade 
credit and bank loans. 
We also discover that the complementary effect of trade credit on bank loans is more 
profound for firms with relatively opaque firm-level information and for firms located in 
regions with less developed external institutions. These findings further demonstrate the role 
of trade credit in extenuating banks’ concern about large shareholders’ 
opportunistic behaviour at borrowing firms. 
Finally, we find that firms switch from more expensive trade credit to less costly bank loans 
as the main source of debt financing as they age, which is consistent with findings in many 
prior studies. However, we provide further evidence that such a process is moderated by 
information opacity as well as institutional development. Specifically, the process is slowed 
down by opaque corporate information and weak presence of external institutions. 
In summary, our study provides consistent and convincing evidence that a firm’s use of 
trade credit has a complementary effect on its access to bank loans and such an effect is 
particularly strong for firms with high perceived agency costs. This study deepens our 
understanding about the relationship between trade credit and bank loans, and makes a 
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This table provides detailed descriptions of main variables used in the analyses. 
Variable Definition 
New bank loans Newly granted bank loans in year t / total assets in year t-1 
BLTA Bank loans / total assets 
BLTD Bank loans / total debt 
APTA Accounts payable / total assets 
APTD Accounts payable / total debt 
APTS Accounts payable / total sales 
Ln(assets) Natural log of total assets 
Ln(age+1) Natural log of (firm age +1) 
Tangibility Fixed assets / total assets 
Leverage Total debt / total assets 
ROA Net income / total assets 
Growth (This year’s sales – last year’s sales) / last year’s sales 
Cash flow Operating cash flow / total assets 
Outside directors Number of outside directors / total number of board directors 
Foreign Percentage of shares owned by foreign entities 
Government Percentage of shares owned by government agencies 
Total savings The total amount of savings deposit in financial institutions in the 
province in which a firm is headquartered 
Small auditor A dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s annual report is audited by a 
small auditor and zero otherwise 
Ln(analyst+1) Natural log of (number of stock analysts following a firm + 1) 
CSI300 A dummy variable that equals one if a firm is included in the CSI300 index 
and zero otherwise 
Marketization Ranking (from 1 to 31) of the overall level of marketization in the province 
in which a firm is headquartered. A ranking of 1 indicates the highest level 
ofmarketization and a ranking of 31 indicates the lowest 
Property rights Ranking (from 1 to 31) of the level of legal protection of property rights in 
the province in which a firm is headquartered. A ranking of 1 indicates the 
highest level of protection and a ranking of 31 indicates the lowest 
Lawyers Ranking (from 1 to 31) of the number of lawyers per 10,000 people in the 
province in which a firm is headquartered. A ranking of 1 indicates the 


















This table provides summary statistics for the main variables. Descriptions of all variables are reported 
in Table 1. 
  obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max 
APTA 13243 0.088 0.068 0 0.071 0.354 
APTD 13243 0.214 0.166 0 0.172 0.754 
APTS 13243 0.182 0.178 0.002 0.132 1.465 
BLTA 13243 0.174 0.158 0 0.148 0.666 
BLTD 13243 0.328 0.248 0 0.330 0.844 
Total assets 
(100 million yuan) 13243 377 591 1.25 21.7 2,210 
Age (in years) 13243 6.626 5.916 0 5 22 
Tangibility 13243 0.389 0.200 0.023 0.377 0.873 
Leverage 13243 0.653 0.591 0.045 0.440 2.002 
ROA 13243 0.069 0.174 -0.946 0.073 0.744 
Growth 13243 0.052 0.043 -2.458 0.091 0.853 
Cash flow 13243 0.038 0.081 -0.234 0.039 0.267 
Outside directors 13243 0.371 0.054 0 0.333 0.571 
Foreign 13243 0.017 0.016 0 0 0.716 
Government 13243 0.063 0.081 0 0.033 0.394 
Total savings 






















Effect of trade credit use on new bank loans granted 
This table presents the regression results for the effect of trade credit use on new bank loans granted 
to firms. The dependent variable is newly granted bank loans scaled by total assets. Trade credit is 
measured by accounts payable scaled by total assets (Column 1) or scaled by total sales (Column 2). 
All other variables are defined in Table 1. P-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
  Dependent variable: New bank loans 




APTSt-1   0.007** 
(0.013) 












































Year Included Included 
Industry Included Included 
Year*Industry Included Included 
No. of obs. 13243 13243 









Information opacity and the effect of trade credit use on new bank loans granted 
This table presents the regression results for the effect of information opacity on the relation between 
trade credit use and new bank loans granted to firms. The dependent variable is newly granted bank 
loans scaled by total assets. Corporate information opacity is measured by three proxies, namely, a 
dummy indicating annual report being audited by a small auditor, natural log of the number of analysts 
following the firm, and a dummy indicating inclusion in the CSI300 index. P-values adjusted for firm-
level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
  
  Dependent variable: New bank loans 







APTAt-1 *Small auditort-1 1.544*** 
(0.003) 
    
APTAt-1 *Ln(analysts+1)t-1   -0.177** 
(0.024) 
  
APTAt-1* CSI300t-1     -0.766** 
(0.019) 
Small auditort-1 0.076 
(0.258) 
    
Ln(analysts+1)t-1   0.023 
(0.224) 
  
CSI300t-1     -0.099 
(0.281) 
Control variables Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Included Included Included 
No. of obs. 13243 13243 13243 



















External institutions and the effect of trade credit use on new bank loans granted 
This table presents the regression results for the effect of external institutions on the relation between 
trade credit use and new bank loans granted to firms. The dependent variable is newly granted bank 
loans scaled by total assets. External institutions are measured by three variables. Marketization is the 
ranking of the overall level of marketization in the province in which a firm is headquartered.  Property 
rights is the ranking of the level of legal protection of property rights in the province in which a firm is 
headquartered. Lawyers is the ranking of the number of lawyers per 10,000 people in the province in 
which a firm is headquartered. P-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
  Dependent variable: New bank loans 







APTAt-1 * Marketization 0.107*** 
(0.004) 
    
APTAt-1 * Property  rights   0.105*** 
(0.003) 
  




    
Property  rights   0.011*** 
(0.002) 
  
Lawyers     0.006 
(0.126) 
Control variables Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Included Included Included 
No. of obs. 9686 9686 9686 















Table 6 Subsample analysis of the effects of trade credit use on new bank loans granted 
  
Panel A: 
This panel presents the regression results for the effect of trade credit use on new bank loans granted 
for young firms and old firms, respectively. The dependent variable is newly granted bank loans scaled 
by total assets. Column 1 and Column 2 report the results for young firms (i.e., firm age below sample 
median). Column 3 and Column 4 report the results for old firms (i.e., firm age above sample 
median). P-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: New bank loans 
  Young firms Old firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
APTAt-1 2.926*** 
(0.000) 
  0.616* 
(0.051) 
  
APTSt-1   0.410*** 
(0.007) 
  0.005* 
(0.074) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Included Included Included Included 
No. of obs. 7137 7137 6106 6106 
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.133 0.097 0.088 
  
Panel B: 
This panel presents the regression results for the effect of information opacity on the relationship 
between trade credit use and new bank loans granted for young firms and old firms, respectively. The 
dependent variable is newly granted bank loans scaled by total assets. Corporate information opacity 
is measured by three proxies, namely, a dummy indicating annual report being audited by a small 
auditor, natural log of stock analysts following the firm, and a dummy indicating inclusion in the 
CSI300 index. Columns 1 to 3 report the results for young firms (i.e., firm age below sample median). 
Columns 4 to 6 report the results for old firms (i.e., firm age above sample median). P-values adjusted 
for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: New bank loans 
  Young firms Old firms 

















    0.806 
(0.137) 
    
APTAt-
1 *Ln(analysts+1)t-1 
  -0.614*** 
(0.008) 
    -0.139 
(0.587) 
  
APTAt-1* CSI300t-1     -4.924*** 
(0.002) 
    -0.559 
(0.471) 
Small auditort-1 -0.037 
(0.226) 
    0.083 
(0.247) 
    
Ln(analysts+1)t-1   0.112* 
(0.100) 
    0.016 
(0.591) 
  
CSI300t-1     0.433* 
(0.084) 
    0.018 
(0.849) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of obs. 7137 7137 7137 6106 6106 6106 




This panel presents the regression results for the effect of external institutions on the relationship 
between trade credit use and new bank loans granted for young firms and old firms, respectively. The 
dependent variable is newly granted bank loans scaled by total assets. External institutions are 
measured by three variables. Marketization is the ranking of the overall level of marketization in the 
province in which a firm is headquartered.  Property rights is the ranking of the level of legal 
protection of property rights in the province in which a firm is headquartered. Lawyers is the ranking 
of the number of lawyers per 10,000 people in the province in which a firm is headquartered. Columns 
1 to 3 report the results for young firms (i.e., firm age below sample median). Columns 4 to 6 report 
the rsults for old firms (i.e., firm age above sample median). P-values adjusted for firm-level clustering 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
  
  Dependent variable: New bank loans 
  Young firms Old firms 

















    0.055 
(0.104) 
    
APTAt-
1 * Property  rights 
  0.185** 
(0.018) 
    0.059* 
(0.096) 
  
APTAt-1 * Lawyers     0.139** 
(0.019) 




    0.004 
(0.201) 
    
Property  rights   0.020*** 
(0.007) 
    0.005 
(0.106) 
  
Lawyers     0.016** 
(0.034) 
    0.001 
(0.783) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of obs. 5145 5145 5145 4541 4541 4541 

















Relative use of trade credit and bank loans over time 
Panel A: 
This panel reports regression results for the effect of firm age on the relative use of trade credit and 
bank loans. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the ratio of bank loans to total debt (BLTD). The 
dependent variable in Column 2 is the ratio of accounts payable to total debt(APTD). The dependent 
variable in Column 3 is the ratio of accounts payable to the sum of accounts payable and bank 
loans (AP/(AP+BL)). P-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
  BLTD APTD AP/(AP+BL) 
  (1) (2) (3) 


































































Year Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Included Included Included 
No. of obs. 13243 13243 13243 




















This panel reports the regression results for the effect of information opacity on firms’ relative use of 
trade credit and bank loans over time. The dependent variable in Columns 1 to 3 is the ratio of bank 
loans to total debt (BLTD). The dependent variable in Columns 4 to 6 is the ratio of accounts payable 
to total debt (APTD). The dependent variable in Columns 7 to 9 is the ratio of accounts payable to the 
sum of accounts payable and bank loans (AP/(AP+BL)). Corporate information opacity is measured 
by three proxies, namely, a dummy indicating annual report being audited by a small auditor, natural 
log of stock analysts following the firm, and a dummy indicating inclusion in the CSI300 index. P-values 
adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dep. Var.= BLTD Dep. Var. = APTD Dep. Var. = AP/(AP+BL) 
























    0.026** (0.043)     
0.016** 
(0.029)     
Ln(age+1)t-
1* Ln(analysts+1)t-1   
0.013** 











    0.032** (0.043)     
-0.019** 
(0.048)     
-0.028** 
(0.044) 
Small auditort-1 -0.031 
(0.512)     
-0.065 
(0.117)     
-0.022 
(0.661)     
Ln(analysts+1)t-1   0.030* (0.082)     
0.026** 
(0.011)     
0.048** 
(0.024)   
CSI300t-1     0.031 (0.603)     
0.036 
(0.305)     
0.028 
(0.704) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of obs. 13243 13243 13243 13243 13243 13243 13243 13243 13243 




This panel reports the regression results for the effect of external institutions on firms’ relative use of 
trade credit and bank loans over time. The dependent variable in Columns 1 to 3 is the ratio of bank 
loans to total debt (BLTD). The dependent variable in Columns 4 to 6 is the ratio of accounts payable 
to total debt (APTD). The dependent variable in Columns 7 to 9 is the ratio of accounts payable to the 
sum of accounts payable and bank loans (AP/(AP+BL)). Marketization is the ranking of the overall level 
of marketization in the province in which a firm is headquartered.  Property rights is the ranking of the 
level of legal protection of property rights in the province in which a firm is 
headquartered. Lawyers is the ranking of the number of lawyers per 10,000 people in the province in 
which a firm is headquartered. P-values adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dep. Var.= BLTD Dep. Var. = APTD Dep. Var. = AP/(AP+BL) 























    0.014*** 
(0.000) 
    0.009** 
(0.049) 
    
Ln(age+1)t-
1*Property  rights 
  -0.011** 
(0.039) 
    0.011*** 
(0.002) 





    -0.014** 
(0.018) 
    0.007** 
(0.046) 




    -
0.055*** 
(0.000) 
    -0.023 
(0.141) 
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Property  rights   0.033** 
(0.026) 
    -.047*** 
(0.000) 
    -0.028 
(0.138) 
  
Lawyers     0.020 
(0.121) 
    -
0.036*** 
(0.000) 
    -0.025 
(0.193) 
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of obs. 9686 9686 9686 9686 9686 9686 9686 9686 9686 





Alternative information opacity proxy 
This table presents the regression results for the effect of information opacity on the relationship 
between trade credit use and new bank loans granted. The dependent variable is newly granted bank 
loans scaled by total assets. Information opacity is measured by an opacity index (Opacity) that 
consists of three components: trading volume, proportion of zero-return trading days, and stock 
return volatilities. Control variables are included but their coefficients are not reported. P-values 
adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: New bank loans 
  Full sample Young firms Old firms 



















Control variables Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Included Included Included 
No. of obs. 13243 13243 13243 


















Effect of global financial crisis 
This table reports regression results for the effect of global financial crisis (GFC) on the relationship 
between use of trade credit and new bank loans granted. The dependent variable is newly granted 
bank loans scaled by total assets. Year08 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for all observations in year 
2008 and zero for all other observations. Year09 and Year10 are similarly defined. Control variables 
are included in all regressions but their coefficients are not reported. P-values adjusted for firm-level 
clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: New bank loans 









    
Year08 0.031 
(0.727) 
    
APTAt-1*Year09   0.522*** 
(0.000) 
  
Year09   -0.235* 
(0.069) 
  
APTAt-1*Year10     0.188* 
(0.075) 
Year10     -0.087 
(0.415) 
Control variables Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included 
Year*Industry Included Included Included 
No. of obs. 13243 13243 13243 





[1]  In our main tests, an auditor is regarded as a big auditor if it is one of the international Big Four (Deloitte, 
E&Y, KPMG, & PwC) or the largest six domestic auditors by revenue 
(Shanghai Lixin, XinyongZhonghe, Yuehua, Daxin, Dahua, & Zhongshen). Inevitably, it is a subjective 
judgement as to how many domestic auditors are deemed to be big auditors. As a robustness check, we 
alternatively classify the largest eight (Chen et al., 2011) or the largest fifteen auditors (Firth et al., 2011) as big 
auditors. Our main empirical results are robust to these alternative definitions. 
[2] There are other studies that examine the effect of firm age on bank loan access from different approach. 
For example, Barclay et al. (2003) argue that old firms are likely to have more assets available as collateral and 
they are also inclined to have more stable cash flows. This is not the focus of our study as we investigate the age 
effect from an agency cost perspective. We control fixed assets, firm size, and cash flows in all our regressions. 
[3] As a robustness test, we define the firm’s age as the number of years since the firm is publicly listed. Our 
main results are qualitatively similar when we use this alternative definition. 
[4] As in section 3.2, we only report regression results using APTA as the key independent variable in Panel B 
and Panel C. The results are qualitatively similar when we use APTS and are available upon request. 
[5] The test results are available from the authors upon request. 
